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PARADOX, POETRY, AND ETERNITY:
SOCRATES, PARMENIDES, AND NIETZSCHE1
Scott Austin
Texas A&M University
Wednesday, December 28, 1988
Washington, D.C.
Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy
Abstractly, some metalanguages and their allied languages are such that the metalinguistic
truths cannot be put into the language itself without a (fruitful or devastating) paradox which breaks
the very rules which the metalanguage itself enunciates for the language. Others are such that the
transposition of metalanguage into language occurs without difficulty. The status of philosophy as
a purported "science of all sciences" from classical times to the present hangs on this difference; for,
unless there can be speech about speech in one’s own (however elaborated) natural language, the
metaphysical enterprise sooner or later topples, to be replaced by faith, poetry, or sociology, to name
only a few (not inferior, but non-ontological) examples.
But this is too abstract, and moreover represents a conclusion, not an introduction. I shall
here be concerned with one example of each type of metalanguage-language relationship, with
examples taken from the ancient world: Parmenides and Socrates, as I think each can be read, and
as I have attempted to read them before.2 I shall then add detail and documentation in the case of
Socrates, and attempt to reflect in a new way on what emerges from the juxtaposition of these two
figures for philosophy of first principles, for the concerns I have raised in the first paragraph above.
The dominant contemporary view on Parmenides* discovery of reason really dates from Plato’s
Sophist. It is best found now in the writings of Owen, Furth, Nussbaum, and MacKenzie.3 The idea
is that Parmenides was an absolute monist who argued for his view by shunning what is not (whatever
that is) and who therefore embroiled himself in all sorts of necessary paradoxes of self-referential
inconsistency, knowing full well that this was what he was doing and intending the resulting
paradoxes as pedagogical tools. They make one understand the doctrine and thus why they are
unnecessary. To put the account of the view crudely: if a thing comes to be or perishes or changes,
then it is not what it was or will be (the dreaded "is not"); if it has gaps or inhomogeneities, it is not
in one place as it is in another; finally, if there are two things, each is not the other. Thus
Parmenidean being must be, as his goddess says in Fragment 8 of the poem, "ungenerable . . .
unperishing . . . a whole of a single kind, unmoving and perfect." It has to be conceded to this view
that it has explanatory adequacy, as it does account for the transcendental predicates that are claimed
and proven of being.
The trouble is, it explains too much. Parmenides is not just an absolute monist, on my view
as on theirs; he is one with a particular twist. It’s not just that (again, in spite of Plato’s Sophist)
Parmenideans have trouble explaining how appearance can be different from reality if all is one, nor
just that numerically different words supposedly expressive of truths about being cannot exist if all
is one, nor even how the single word "being" could denote the thing being if there is no difference;
in these senses, absolute monism could perhaps best be communicated as in Zen monasteries with a
shrug of the shoulders,4 and pedagogically undertaken self-referential inconsistency is unavoidable.
1 do not see how to clear Parmenides of these charges--if they are charges--indeed, students like to
point out to me that he winds up in the same boat as Cratylus the Heraclitean, who, convinced that
the world was so changeable that language could not fix it, settled for raising a single finger in silence
as his ultimate expressive device.
It is instead with other accusations of self-referential inconsistency that I am preoccupied.
I hoped to clear Parmenides of these and in so doing to establish the difference from Socrates that
I mentioned earlier. The fact is that if you read Parmenides’ poem you will find the goddess many
times using the very "it is not" that she herself had apparently prohibited, in vocabulary
("ungenerable”). in syntax ("nor is it divisible"), and in proof, by denying the opposite of what she
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wants to prove. Indeed, she negates more often than she asserts. And this apparent inconsistency
seems peculiar to Parmenides, not just one allied to absolute monism in general. For the view \ am
criticizing, it is just one more inconsistency, a way for her to get us to see her views by getting us
to see that she cannot speak without flouting them.
But without rerehearsing too much a case I have made elsewhere, let me please just say that
I found this interpretation not simple-minded enough. The goddess surrounds her speech with
metaphors of persuasion, trust, necessity, and unshakability, and even signals to us explicitly, when
she later begins to treat human views instead of true views, that her words are then to be taken as
deceptive; but there is no such signal in her account of being, which reads simply like literal
transcendental argument. I have suggested a hypothesis which would, I believe, allow us to take her
at face value without dispensing with the unavoidable monistic paradoxes, one which would have
her show us what to do and how to think by not having her break her own negation-rules before we
are all mystically united with being. Indeed, I think, the latter is not possible without the former;
for a speech all of whose words undercut themselves in a patternless way is indistinguishable from
silence. The idea is that if it is not necessary to take the self-referential inconsistencies as owing to
negation, then the hypothesis that the negative words are literally meant is at least possible.
If you will take my word for it, sentences of the following types do or could occur in the
poem’s proof

SisP
S is not-P
not-S is P
(not-S is not-P)
together with some negations of sentences as a whole. But sentences of the following type do not:
S is-not P (S isn’t P)
S is-not not P (S isn’t not-P)
not-S is-not P (not-S isn’t P)
not-S is-not not-P (not-S isn’t not-P)
The only Greek expression which is unambiguously reducible to the "isn’t" in the sentences which do
not occur is ouk esti, "is-not"--and yet this is the very expression which is prohibited by the goddess
when she makes the prohibitions which base the subsequent proofs. Thus what is prohibited—i.e.
a negated copula—never occurs except modally or as prohibited, etc., as a sequence of words, though
most every other conceivable kind of subject--or predicate—negation does occur. To me the message
seems to be that the language was intended to be positive, that other kinds of negation besides that
of the copula can and do occur, and that copula-negation was prohibited because it was thought to
rob the sentence of meaning, i.e. possible function as a judgement connecting subject and predicate.
Thus the proofs themselves, I think, need not be self-referentially inconsistent at least because of
their negations, and the language can be literal transcendental argument which does not need to
undercut itself in order to make its point. This is the hypothesis.
I am, then, claiming that Parmenides on one level is a master of bold-faced speech, not of
paradoxes. I shall say precisely the opposite of Socrates, and here it is surprising that major views
try to give a literal, non-paradoxical reading of a major issue in Socrates’ life: how does he whose
wisdom consists in ignorance, know that he does not know? Thus the views of Socrates taken by
others and by myself will be opposites, though in opposite ways.
Socrates’ friend Chaerephon consulted the oracle and found out that no one was wiser than
Socrates. The statement is interestingly ambiguous; either Socrates is on a pinnacle above the rest of
us, or we are all on the same level. I shall suggest that both are true. The story is from the Apology.
Socrates, sure of his own lack of wisdom yet unwilling to believe Apollo capable of a lie, conducts
a series of interviews with politicians, poets, and craftspeople. Either he will find out that they really
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are as wise as they are supposed to be (and thus a fortiori wiser than he), or he will trip them up.
(The word "wise" here could initially cover success in any of these human domains.) What he finds
is that, though undeniably successful, the politicians and poets cannot give an account of themselves,
and the craftspeople, though wise in the technical sense, are lost on the level of theory. It is not so
much what any of these people are doing that is objectionable to Socrates; it is that they will accept
the title of "wise" without what he regards as its precondition—some sort of rational justification.
Of course, he does not have one either, and thus is strictly on their level—the first half of the oracle’s
ambiguity. Yet he has discernment somehow about this fact about himself and about others; knowing
that he lacks a justification, he knows that he does not know, and thus is better off than all his
interlocutors, who all think they know even though they really don’t. And this is the second possible
reading of the ambiguous oracle. I would suggest, though Apollo did not say so, (Apollo rarely says
what he means), that Socrates’ ignorance makes him no less ignorant than the rest of us, but that his
knowledge of that ignorance is meant to make him wiser, thus both sides of the ambiguity come to
the same thing. Note how limited the scope of the wisdom is; it consists only in a reflection
performed on a lower-order lack of wisdom, and results only in a hypothetical conclusion: if I am
wise, it can only be because I know that I am not. The god’s wisdom, speaking df course from a
higher plane, knows that only those humans who know that they are only human are worthy to
perform the civic role of questioners, gadflies, and eventual victims of judicial murder.
I have said that Socrates somehow has "discernment" or "knowledge" of his own ignorance, and
that this enables him to agree with the God’s ambiguous assessment of him as a mortal who transcends
his own mortality through the very act of knowing it. Since I also earlier claimed that other
interpreters try to remove the sting of the paradox while I would like to intensify it, let me go on in
an attempt to argue.
I have relied so far on the Apology in making the claim that Socrates’ ignorance is not a mere
toying with metalanguages but is crucial to how he thinks about how he is supposed to behave.
Indeed, in the Lysis, Laches, and CAarw/i/cs—traditionally early dialogues in part because they end
also in confessions of ignorance—it is clear what the results are in terms of pedagogical strategy, and
it is thus unnecessary to try to document further the centrality of these statements for him. The
question is: is the paradox a paradox at all? is it defusible?
In an effort to shrink the wide spectrum of opinions on the subject I would like to deal simply
with the more literalistic views of Gregory Vlastos and a conventionalism I find an interesting
challenge. Once again, my goal is to attribute to Socrates just the opposite of what I attributed to
Parmenides, and I hope that the significance of this will appear fully later.5
Thrasymachus says in Republic, Book I, that Socrates is lying and feigning ignorance in order
to trap people. While, in my opinion, there is certainly an element of strategy in the claim not to
know (what better way to expose tenderest beliefs for manipulation) it must be at least ironically
sincere (in the modern sense, in which even irony can tell the truth) if reflection on it is to have
started Socrates on a career ending in the failure of personal relationships and execution after a show
trial. Quite apart from what he says in the Apology, a cocktail-party parasite would have begged off
as soon as his or her own gratification or welfare were in question. Nor, I think, could it have been
a matter of simple belief or right opinion, this stance towards his own ignorance, and that for the
same reason; not only are we told that he concluded what he did because of an imperative emanating
from the oracle, but the entire Socratic elenchus is directed toward the examination of opinions; an
opinion about his own ignorance and concomitant course of life would never have been allowed to
star.i unprobed. It could be that he is making a mistake, but he will always give you his reasons.
If we dismiss lies and true or false opinions, one path will suggest conventions and Vlastos
will suggest knowledge—but a nonparadoxical kind of knowledge.
Could it be that Socrates is a cultured citizen of Athens who takes beliefs common to all
cultured and no-so-cultured interlocutors and simply follows their lead, inevitably winding up in
cohtrâdietion, in the conviction of ignorance both for himself and his hearers? Here we would not
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have just belief, of course, but reason operating on belief; but all of us have been in the sad
condition of realizing that our hopefully crystalline theoretical formulations were not matched in
cogency by our practical maxims or by each other. This is a conventionalist view as I understand it.
The difficulty is: how does one know that the beliefs are in conflict? One cannot just believe
it, for the reasons I have explained. One cannot know it without having some grounding for the
rules of reason on the basis of which one conducts one’s arguments. How does one know that a belief
needs a justification? That an elicited contradiction dooms an assertion? That a definition is not a
set of examples? That reductio ad absurdum argument works? That rational agreement through
dialectic is a good social goal? How does one know the truth of the arts of negation, subordination,
and syllogism? Only, I think, the avoidance of contradiction could be said to be a culturally
cultivated practice; the other things I have mentioned are things that Socrates repeatedly has to drum
into his interlocutors as if they had never encountered them before. Surely Socrates practiced a new
kind of reason, not hitherto encountered, at the expense of all, including himself, not reducible to
the norms and customs of cultivated conversation, if his criticism was that people did not know
what they believed, then he must have known at least those argumentative techniques and
presuppositions that he himself used.
But this makes the problem deeper. How could he have known these things when he said he
did not know, in fact used them to expose ignorance? Here Vlastos, by distinguishing between two
kinds of knowledge, attempts to cut through the paradox. The knowledge that Socrates is allowed
to have is called "elenctic knowledge"; the other,which Socrates denies to himself, is called "certain
knowledge." Elenctic knowledge emerges only from one-on-one conversations with interlocutors,
and has to do with the mutual consistency of the beliefs that they specifically hold as expressions of
life-style. Thus Vlastos’ model, if I understand it properly and may extend it, is that if you can show
someone that three of their beliefs are incompatible with a fourth, which they also believe, then
either the fourth is doomed or further investigation into the ranking and logical interrelationships
of the three needs to be performed. Then, if many conversations with many interlocutors lead
Socrates for example to the conclusion that everybody’s real beliefs are surprisingly incompatible with
the idea that it is better to do wrong with impunity than to suffer it, Socrates will claim that he
"knows" that an innocent victim of tyranny is better off than a tyrant. And yet this "knowledge,"
based as it is only on repetition and on the consistency of beliefs furnished by others, is not a priori
or certain like Plato’s claimed knowledge of the good; it is, says Vlastos, just "elenctic." And this is
supposed to dissolve the paradox of Socratic ignorance that I am considering now, since no amount
of elenctic expertise could grant me certain knowledge of my own ignorance. The best Icould have
would be a series of tape-recordings of conversations in which I and my friends were unable to
define anything. Thus there is no paradox, since the elenctic knowledge I have of my own ignorance
is not the certain knowledge I lack when I have that ignorance. If all I have to go on are beliefs and
their incompatibilities, it might be claimed,then even the belief that I do not know is potentially
subject to conversational revision, as long as the Athenian officers of justice permit. And I am sure
Vlastos would argue that this is just what Socrates does when he queries politicians, poets, and
craftspeople, and finds out that they do not know; the lack of certain knowledge is partly a function
of the belief-oriented situation, but also a generalization from the actual conversations that Socrates
did have with all and sundry.
Against this I bring up two points. First, nowhere is it shown how Socrates elenctically knows
the principles of logic, deduction, incompatibility, argument, and dialectic, if these are supposedly
basic to any elenctic conclusion. Indeed, these cannot be elenctically known, but must be known with
certainty, if the elenchus is to proceed. This is the point I made against the conventionalist view.
Thus Socrates must have certain knowledge if he is to know his own ignorance. Otherwise the
elenchus is a mere fugue of ideas with no criteria for argumentative adequacy—which it clearly was
not.
Second, if Vlastos’ view is to work Socrates must know the difference between the knowledge
he has and the knowledge he lacks. Isn’t this philosophical knowledge of the most refined sort? Can
one Sustain a distinction between the probable and the certain without having criteria for what is
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certain? From whence were these criteria derived if not from a theoretical epistemology? Even a
lifetime of experience with elenctic argument would not entitle me to say that my elenctic knowledge
fell short of something unless I had a pretty clear idea of what that something was. Indeed, even
within the elenchus, how do I distinguish between a certain definition and an uncertain one—the
former known to be never achieved—without known metaelenctic criteria for definition and
unshakable truth? Once again, Socrates could not have known his own ignorance without having
certain knowledge of a fairly high theoretical sort.
Thus I take it that Socrates’ attitude towards his own ignorance was not that of a lie, nor a
false or true belief only, nor a conclusion from conventional presuppositions, nor the outcome of
elenchus only. Instead, we must suppose that he knew, for good reason and with full theoretical
certainty, that he did not know even what he knew.
But this, of course, might seem to make the paradox intolerable. For now the principles of
logic and epistemology governing his arguments and guiding his searches are such that, once known,
they show why it is impossible to know even themselves. And this is just the interpretation of
Parmenides I have argued against. Does it make sense to attribute such a situation to Socrates, the
inventor of the ideal of rational clarity in definition with the good life as the end in view?
I think it does. I shall use religious terminology in what follows, but I do not intend an
irrationalist interpretation. Indeed, I hope to show in my conclusion how Socrates and Parmenides
represent two solutions to a fundamental problem within reason.
What makes Socrates human, just like the rest of us, is that he does not know. What makes
him wiser than we, he concludes, is that he knows better than we do that he does not know. That
is his interpretation of the oracle. His divine commission is that, knowing that he does not know,
he can go about infecting the rest of us with his own ignorance. It is thus his uniqueness and his
divine commission which are closely allied to his knowing that he does not know, and thus to the
self-refuting principles on which that knowledge is based.
It follows, I think that the principles themselves are divine, and that Socrates has access to
the divine as he reasons according to them. But he is hot allowed to gain anything from them except
negative conclusions, just as his Daimonion or divine sign always signals to him "no" and never "yes."
Thus he is not a god, and cannot define beauty or virtue in the early dialogues. More than that, in
convicting him of ignorance, the divine again and again convicts him of ignorance even of itself, and
bumps his sloping satyr-like forehead against the dust of our common humanity as it wipes out
knowledge of the very principles on which the conviction of ignorance was based. The result in the
early dialogues is thus not only that the hoped-for definition is stymied, but that doubt is cast on the
very ratiopality which overthrew each definition in turn:
If neither those who love nor are loved, neither the like nor the unlike, nor the good,
nor those who belong to us, nor any other of all of the suppositions which we passed
in review . . . If, I say, not one of them is the object of friendship, I no longer know
what I am to say."6
Yet for all that Socrates picks himself up off the ground again, convinced of his humanity yet always
striving to transcend it, knowing yet not-knowing, supplied with divine criteria yet without the
means to attain them, avoiding relativism and scepticism by his refusal to give up, avoiding platonism
by his refusal to claim even one shred of a paradoxical certain knowledge that is not properly his
own. Such, at any rate, would be a reading which refused to weaken the paradox of Socratic
ignorance and which then went on to see a connection between the divine mission ahd the part of
Socrates which knows that he does not know. And this is not an unrecognizable Socrates: the
Charmides who acquires more temperance by acknowledging that he does not know what temperance
is, the trio—Socrates, Lysis, and Menexenus--who, in spite of differences in age, become friends in
part by acknowledging their ignorance of friendship—all are examples of the creative moral use of
ignorance, the use of principles of reason whose human significance lies in part in their biting their
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own tails. The divine significance of self-referential inconsistency is an old story in negative and
redemptive theology. What I have tried to do is to see the same phenomenon at work here, to see
underneath Socrates’ silenus mask to the golden statues of wisdom within, as poor Alcibiades puts it
in the Symposium.
Some examples may be useful here. The Lysis*ultimate ignorance of friendship is, of course,
based on poetic and other maxims, scientific theories, teleology, psychology, not to mention various
ordinary principles of reasoning or—in general—acts of reasoning assented to by an interlocutor in
order to reach conclusions which destroy themselves, are mutually contradictory, are replaced by
fresh hypotheses and terminate in a final aporia. This aporta thus comes about not just because of
the hypotheses which ruled each other out but because all appeared supported by one or another
knowledge—claim.
To be more specific: the following are major principles and specimens of inference which
leap out even from casual perusal of the Lysis in English. I shall show below how they function in
the argument. The criterion for the selection, which is not intended to be exhaustive, is that what
is selected be used or deferred to as a basis for subsequent arguments, yet itself not be argued for
antecedently.7
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
GO)
(M)
(12)
(13)

207C friends share and share alike
207D to love is to want to make someone as happy as possible
208A-■210D empirical examples of how one has liberty and is useful
in matters about which one is knowledgeable
210C- D the useless can have no friends and are unlovable
212E animals cannot love in return
you can be a friend to your children when punishing them even if they hate you at
213
the time
214D the bad are too variable to be friends
215A the good qua good are self-sufficient
216B friendship is not a friend to enmity or vice versa
216A the beautiful is friendly
22 ID desire is for that of which one is in want
221E that of which one is in want is that which has been taken from one

I call these "examples": (3)-(4), (6), (7); and these "rules and generalizations": (1), (2), (5), (8), (9),
(10), (11), (12), (13).
(2)-(5) are the core of Socrates’ protreptic with Lysis; (6) and (7) are involved in major alternatives
in Socrates’ consideration with Menexenus of loving and being loved; (8) and (9) by themselves defeat
the entire consideration of friendship among the bad and among the good, respectively; (10) defeats
the claim that friendship is between opposites; (12) and (13), by leading to the absurd claim that all
desire is reciprocated, defeat the possibility that love might be desire.
Thus we have statements with no preceding argument, agreed upon by Socrates and his
interlocutor, most crucial to the refutations and thus to the aporia. Please note that I am not levying
the charge that Socratic dialectic rests on unfounded premises. I am instead attempting to make the
point that refutations in the dialogue’s complex aporia often depend on treating something as known
—i.e. that this ignorance depends on knowledge as manifested by joint assent to a rule or to the
interpretation and significance of a counterexample, That is, the final aporia depends on each
preceding refutations’ having been successful, and thus on the principles I have just listed. Thus
ignorance here rests on knowledge, so far as I can see.
What is at issue are two models of Greek reason: a direct, descriptive, canonically
methodological one based on transcendental argument, versus a kind of reasons which works
pëdago'gically or morally through a kind of language which violates its own principles and thus
Üñderctits itself. What is even more at issue is a problem in the foundations of reason. If as a lover
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of philosophy one is interested in the question of how to justify first principles, then these are two
among many other models for making or for abandoning the attempt. The question is: given some
principles and what one might call a sphere of discourse governed by those principles—a
metalanguage and a language—can the principles be expressed literally in the sphere of discourse
which they govern or does the mere attempt to do so generate paradoxes because speech within the
sphere can be only presuppose the principles, not express them? Under many circumstances I
suppose the answer could fall either way, but—if there are any such universal principles without
infinite regress—it is at least harder to give an answer in the case of first principles, since, if there
is no discourse for them which is in either way accessible, then both Greek models will fall.
Let me consider some modern models. One claim in Nietzsche’s Genealogy o f Morals seems
to be that the Christian theologically- and morally-based conscience eventually turns against itself
in that its criteria for truth, when made stricter and stricter, eventually make one deny that very
belief in god as truth on which such a conscience was originally based. I am not concerned now with
the truth or falsity of Nietzsche’s claim, but only on its structure and paradox. God inspires criteria
which turn against god--but that is only the first paradox, and it by no means leads to atheism by
itself alone. The second paradox is that, without god in the first place, there would have been no
criteria to use against god. Well then? Nietzsche leaves the solution of this paradox to readers. But
if one understands that all non-relativistic notions of truth are bound up for him with the notion of
god, the results will not be an absolutistic atheism so much as the demonstration that absolutism is
self-undercutting in a way that leads inevitably to relativism. Not relativism as a separate, opposed
position, but relativism as emerging paradox within absolutism. And here the historical irony is
evident to readers of the Theaetetus, where relativism and its paradoxes (e.g. is relativism relative
only to relativists?) are argued against from an absolutistic standpoint in the quest for knowledge.
All these, I would think, are attempts to demonstrate that canons for truth cannot be formulated in
the sphere of the language they govern without inevitably undercutting themselves. The only
statements possible are "this is my norm," or "there are our norms," without any attempt to give
Parmenidean reasons, or even Socratic ones. And Nietzsche then goes on to see such norms as canons
of the creative will, rejoicing in the absence of reasons.
For the latter Wittgenstein, too, certain conventional philosophical problems are expressions
of failures to understand the difference between statements made within languages and statements
made about the social behavior underlying languages. This is the same problem, only with an attempt
to keep paradoxes away, to preserve the distinction between language and metalanguage.
(Unfortunately the question of the status of statements made about social behavior itself is not
sufficiently addressed. "This is the way we do it" does not solve a metaphysical problem, and one
senses unexamined Nietzschian paradoxes in the background.) Moreover, in the face of the sustained
Nietzschian critique of Parmenidean truth, it is not enough to say that we need it in order to solve
ethical problems or problems of social justice (for there is no reason why such problems should be
soluble); nor is it enough to give a reductionistic explanation of any sort, since the bottom level of
the pyramid of reduction must be describable as if true à la Parmenides even if the top level is
Parmenides himself disguised as some ideology or other. Nor—certainly--will it do to resurrect the
past.
Plato in the Timaeus posed his challenge to all subsequent philosophy thus: i f there is a
distinction between true opinion and knowledge, then there must be a distinction between platonic
forms and particulars, each mode of cognition corresponding to an appropriate object. Aristotle
disagreed, thinking that one could have the one without the other. My version is not too far off:
either stable Parmenidean reason or the self-undercutting, relative modes found in different ways
in Socrates or (at the end of our tradition) Nietzsche. Of course there are many compromises. But
it could be maintained that our historical position is indeed a fortunate one; for the corrosive of
Nietzsche, it could be maintained, eats through much of our current thought, while the whole
dichotomy is now historically accessible to us at both its extremes.
Yet one cannot help but be uncomfortable, and to wonder what lies ahead. The
imperturbable silence of absolute monism versus the din of relativism, which speaks in many
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tongues? Plato’s compromise was programmatically designed to fit in between just these alternatives.
And yet, as I have perhaps indicated, I am somewhat suspicious of bold Platonic definitions
undertaken where even Socrates withheld his hand out of sheer humility.
What I think is common to both extremes is a certain insistence on eternity, allied with a kind
of poetry. Here I do not mean poetry in the fashionable twentieth-century sense, in which one
laments the past in language nobody can understand, makes a fetish of one’s own act of creation,
bewails one’s inability to write, calls literary criticism poetry, or comments in verse on a tradition
which is rendered dead as if it had ever been only a text in the first place. I mean poetry in the
visionary sense, as proclaiming the sight of the eternal in the temporal. Homer and Parmenides wrote
songs; Plato wrote plays.
But why should eternity be a workable notion after Nietzsche? Parmenides’ goddess registers
being in the "now" of eternity; Platonic time is a moving image of eternity; but all Nietzsche offers
us—and that in a prophetic mode—is the eternal recurrence, a temporalized eternity. And yet,
paradoxically, the result could be viewed as even stronger than the classical version. It is numerically
the same event which recurs endlessly in Nietzsche, since all principles of individuation between
events (including clocks) also recur and are thus indistinguishable from their recurrences. Thus the
cosmos as a whole displays itself across time—or rather, defines a delimited chunk of time—and yet
is at the same time a frozen moment which does not itself traverse time, there being in reality only
one recurrence with no time outside it. And this frozen moment—whatever its inside structure may
be—is eternal in the same way as Parmenides’ eternal sphere. Thus eternity as an expression of
hermeneutical cycles at the end of the tradition parallels eternity as an expression of literal
transcendental argument at the beginning. The notion itself survives and is the common denominator
between Nietzsche and his antithesis. Nor is this residual traditionalism in Nietzsche, or a Nietzsche
who temporarily burst free in Zarathustra from his aphoristic, nihilistic side; it is rather that linear
temporality without a recurrence would be for him an expression of classical truth, something that
would make it impossible for me to sanctify my own relativistic deeds and values by willing them
m yself in perpetuity rather than submitting them to someone else’s demarcated scheme. Thus, he
would say, a mere twentieth-century temporalization or reduction of values would repress the instinct
of creation that sets values free. Both the Eleatic tradition and its opposite, then, are committed to
a perpetual sabbath of the "now." And this is where we have to start.
Now, I am not going to pretend that Parmenidean eternity incorporates the temporal in the
same way that Nietzsche’s does. For Parmenides the temporal is a strict bastardization, yet even he
is constrained by hermeneutics, if by nothing else, to pose his vision as a young man’s chariot-ride
to the edge of the earth, his penetration through the grinding axioms of justice and warm reception
by a goddess, his steerage, like Telemachus in the Odyssey, along the proper route to the homeland
of truth, and truth’s own bondage to the fixity in chains of justice, necessity, and doom—all poetry
whose literary antecedents have been speculated about since antiquity, and just as wild in its
occupation of literary mountain-tops as parts of Zarathustra. In the end for Parmenides this is to
dissolve into the mystical vision of a "ring of endless light"; but the poetry contains that eternal goal
of the fantastic voyage from the beginning. And it is not necessary to speak of Nietzsche’s poetry,
or of Blake, Milton, or Dante, as finding in things and human feelings not only images of things
above but also the clear presence of their archetypes in things below, a compresence of eternity in
time which is seen and then recorded or prophetically spoken.
This is not to saÿ that visionary poetry is the ultimate fulfillment of the philosophical quest.
But it is an appropriate accompaniment of our tradition both at its beginning and at its end, in the
light of the notion of eternity, however conceived.
I am well aware that a call for a philosophical future in which eternity couples with poetry
may seem insufficiently clear.
But I would hope at least to have reflected on certain
metaphilosophical considerations, to have shown that these generate at least two types of
philosophical speech, to have situated these within the tradition, especially at the beginning and at
the end, to have provided historical and documentary reasons for situating them so, particularly
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arguments about Socrates. I will suggest in a moment that both types of speech can converge, but
I will have for the moment to leave solution, elaboration and criticism to better heads than mine.
Nietzsche suggests that a dionysian drunkard, fresh from an orgy of libido and raw animal
meat, might pass out under a tree and, in a dream, conceive the golden vision of Apollo. If so,
rational clarity is only the inverse image of our animal sap, the jugular instincts we attempt in vain
to hold in behind the prison walls of consciousness until we overflow. The traditional version of
philosophy, on the other hand, views Socrates as a hero because no amount of wine diminishes his
dialectical clarity or resistance to sexual temptation. If these versions are compatible, it can only be
because both are necessary. And this would be William Blake’s
To see a World in a Grain of Sand
And a Heaven in a Wild Flower.8

(
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Endnotes

1.
Iam very grateful to the Society for its invitation to read this paper. I would especially like
to thank Paul Woodruff for help and suggestions, including bibliographical. I refer the reader to his
"Plato’s Early Theory of Knowledge," forthcoming in Stephen Everson, E d Ancient Greek Theories
o f Knowledge (Cambridge University Press) for a different treatment of these issues. For Woodruff
the question is one of expertise, not certainty. Further acknowledgements are contained in the pieces
of mine I mention in note 2. The accounts of what I believe to be Parmenidean and Socratic theory
in this present article are in the main freshly written, truncated versions of what is in these earlier
pieces, but I hope to have juxtaposed them while saying something new. The body of this paper was
read as a presentation at Texas A&M University, The New School for Social Research, Colgate
University, and the University of Texas at Austin; I thank audiences at these schools for stimulating
discussion and for making it possible for the readings to occur. No one mentioned here or in earlier
acknowledgements is to be presumed to agree with me or to be held responsible for faults in my
thoughts and writing.
2.
Parmenides: Being, Bounds, and Logic (Yale University Press, 1986) and "The Paradox of
Socratic Ignorance (How to Know What You Don’t Know)" Philosophical Topics 15:2 (pp. 23-34).
I have chosen not to argue here for my views on Parmenides as I have for my views on Socrates, but
simply to state them without reference to extremely recent treatments.
3.
See G.E.L. Owen, "Eleatic Questions" Classical Quarterly 10(1960):84-102, reprinted with
revisions in R.G. Allen and D. Furley, Eds., Studies in Presocratic Philosophy (London: Routledge
& Kegan Paul, 1975), Vol. II, pp. 48-41; Montgomery Furth, "Elements of Eleatic Ontology," Journal
o f the History o f Philosophy 7( 1968): 111-32, also in A.P.d. Mourelatos, Ed., The Pre-Socratics
(Garden City: Anchor Press, 1974), pp. 241-70; Martha Nussbaum, "Eleatic Conventionalism and
Philolaus and the Conditions of Thought," Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 83(1979):63-108;
M.M. Mackenzie, "Parmenides’ Dilemma," Phronesis 27(1982): 1-13.
4.
The idea of comparison with Zen practice is from Furth, who uses a different example (see
note 3).
5.
I would like to thank Gregory Vlj^astos for personal communications and for permission to
refer to all or part of what he has said in public or in private. The crucial article by Vlastos is
"Socrates’ Disavowal of Knowledge," Philosophical Quarterly 35(1985): 1-3. I hope that I have
reproduced it accurately also the step-by-step progression of the elenchus as he conceives it. I would
also like to thank Alexander Nehamas for sharing his views with me as mine developed, and to
apologize for a crucial misunderstanding I committed in the article on Socrates.
6.

Lysis 222E. Translated by J. Wright.

7.
i.e.. My criterion for selecting these premises was quite simply that they leaped off of a
somewhat quickly perused English translation as unjustified statements, rules, or examples crucial
to refutations (i.e., they are not themselves the hypotheses being examined) and thus necessarily
known if the final ignorance-claim is to work. That is, such premises are so common that the Lysis
is thick with them and depends on them. However, I can also recommend authors whom I have read
with profit in the past on early Platonic reasoning, particularly in relation to the eleatic tradition:
Svend Ranulf, Der eleatische Satz vom Widerspruch (Copenhagen:Gyldendalske Boghandel, 1924),
four articles by A. Szabó in the Acta Antiqua Academia Scientiarum Hungaricae: "Beiträge zur
Geschichte der griechischen Dialektik" (Vol. 1,1951-52, pp. 377-405); "Zur Geschichte der Dialektik
des Denkens" (Vol. 2, 1953-54, pp. 17-57); "Zum Verständnis der Eleaten" (Vol. 2, 1953-54, pp. 24386); "Eleatica" (Vol. 3, 1955, pp. 67-102), and Geoffrey E.R. Lloyd, Polarity and Analogy: Two
Types o f Argumentation in Early Greek Thought (Cambridge, 1966).
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8.
"Augiries of Innocence," lines 1-2, in the edition of David V. Erdman, Poetry and Prose o f
William Blake (Garden City: Doubleday, Inc., 1970), p. 481.

